This paper studies the characteristics of optimal contracts when the agent is riskaverse in the double moral-hazard situation in which the principal also participates in the production process. It is already known that a simple linear contract is one of many optimal contracts under the double moral-hazard when the agent is risk-neutral. We …nd that the agent's optimal incentive scheme in this case is unique and non-linear, but less sensitive to output than would be designed under a single moral-hazard. We also …nd that the linear contract is not robust in the sense that the above unique and non-linear contract does not approach the linear contract as the agent's risk-aversion approaches zero.
Introduction
A common assumption adopted in the standard moral-hazard literature is that a principal is passive as far as production is concerned. 1 That is, the principal delegates all production decisions to an agent, and designs an incentive contract that is based on common observables correlated with the agent's hidden action choices, such as outputs and realized costs. In many principal-agent relationships, however, the principals do have some choice variables that substantially a¤ect the outcomes. For example, the demand for a product is a¤ected not only by a downstream …rm's (agent) sales e¤ort but also by an upstream …rm's (principal) manufacturing inputs that determine the quality of the product. The relationship between a franchiser and a franchisee is another good example. In her empirical analysis, Lafontaine [16] concludes that a double moralhazard argument on franchising best explains the data. 2 It is only just recently that the double moral-hazard model has begun to be theoretically discussed in the literature. Romano [25] , and Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine [2] show that a simple linear contract in which the principal and the agent proportionally share the output after a certain amount of transfer is made between them implements the second-best outcome when the agent is risk-neutral. When the principal also provides inputs which a¤ect the outcomes, the incentive provision for both the agent's action choice and the principal's own e¤ort level must be taken into account when designing the agent's incentive scheme. There is a strict trade-o¤ between these two incentives, and the full information outcome is not obtainable even if the agent is risk-neutral.
Our objective in this paper is two-fold. First, we analyze the characteristics of optimal contracts under the double moral-hazard when the agent is risk-averse. When the agent is risk-averse, risk sharing between the principal and the agent is also to be considered when designing a contract. Being based on the …rst-order approach, we show that the optimal contract is not generally linear in this case. We also show that the optimal contract under the double moral-hazard is less sensitive to the outcomes than that under the single moral-hazard. Intuition tells us that, since the principal as well as the agent can in ‡uence the outcomes, the changes in outcomes convey only partial information about the agent's hidden e¤ort choice.
Secondly, we examine whether the simple linear contract, which is one of the many optimal contracts when the agent is risk-neutral, remains as a limiting contract when the agent's risk aversion approaches zero, that is, if linear contracts remain robust 1 For the standard agency model, see Ross [26] , Stiglitz [30] , Mirrlees [22] , Harris and Raviv [6] , Holmstrom [8] , and Shavell [28] among others. with respect to the agent's risk aversion. Romano's or Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine's results seem to suggest that the double moral-hazard framework o¤ers a nice explanation for the prevalence of simple linear contracts. However, there are many other contracts that achieve the same e¢ciency in the double moral-hazard situation when the agent is risk-neutral. Therefore, we must examine whether and under what conditions the linear contract is not dominated by other forms of contracts before we accept the explanation. It is indeed found that the linear contracts are NOT robust when the agent's risk aversion converges to zero, suggesting that a linear contract is not a good approximation of the optimal contract under double moral-hazard when the agent is almost risk-neutral.
There are few other papers which also have examined the optimal contracts under the double moral-hazard. Eswaran and Kotwal [4] examine the characteristics of optimal contracts in agriculture under the double moral-hazard situation by con…ning their analysis to linear contracts. Rubin [27] and Mathewson and Winter [19] analyze royalty contracts in franchising under the double moral-hazard. Demski and Sappington [3] show that the full information outcome can be obtained even in the double moralhazard situation when one party can exercise a buyout option after observing the other party's choice variable. 3 However, none of the above has studied the optimal contracts in double moral-hazard when the agent is risk-averse, and nobody has examined the robustness of linear contracts when the agent's risk aversion converges to zero.
Another closely related work was done by Al-Najjar [1] . He considers a situation in which a risk-neutral principal contracts with N risk-averse agents and allocates his own e¤ort inputs among them. Thus, he basically considers a double moral-hazard model with risk-averse agents which is the same as ours. However, one big di¤erence between his and ours is that the number of agents plays a key role in his paper, while it is …xed by one in ours. He shows that when the number of agents increases the situation arbitrarily closely approaches N replications of the single moral-hazard situation. It is because the principal's incentive problem gets smaller as the number of agents increases.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, our basic model is formulated and some results found in the literature assuming the agent is risk-neutral are explained. In Section 3, we characterize the optimal contract under the double moral-hazard when the agent is risk-averse. And in Section 4, we show that the linear contract is not a limiting contract when the agent's risk aversion converges to zero. In Section 5, we provide some numerical examples, and …nally, in Section 6, we make some concluding remarks. 3 Also, see Mann and Wissink [18] .
Risk-Neutral Agent
A risk-neutral principal hires a risk-neutral agent, and they undertake a joint project. After the principal designs a wage contract s for the agent, she provides her e¤ort e 2 R + ; and the agent provides his e¤ort a 2 R + ; non-cooperatively (hereafter, we use 'she' for the principal and 'he' for the agent). A composite e¤ort is represented by c = C(a; e); where C : R 2 + ! R is continuous and di¤erentiable. The output, x; which is commonly observable, is a function of the composite e¤ort C(a; e) and the state of nature µ 2 £; that is, x = X[C(a; e); µ]: The randomness of x is suppressed by parameterization, and F (xjc) denotes the output distribution function conditional on the given composite e¤ort, while f (xjc) represents the output density function. Since x is the only observable, the agent's wage scheme s must be based on x; i.e., s(x): V (e) and v(a) denote disutilities of the principal's and the agent's e¤orts, respectively.
Assumption 2. C a (a; e) > 0; C e (a; e) > 0; C aa (a; e) < 0; C ee (a; e) < 0; and C ae (a; e)¸0: For any x 2 R; F (xjc) is convex in c:
Assumption 1 implies that both parties are work-averse in an increasing manner, while Assumption 2 implies that both parties' e¤orts are productive and complementary with each other. The complementarity condition is especially needed to characterize an optimal contract when the agent is risk-averse (see Lemma B1 in the Appendix).
But, it can be justi…ed as a reason for both parties' undertaking joint production. Assumptions 4 and 5 say that output function X is increasing in c with a decreasing rate in a stochastic sense.
The First-Best
Suppose that the principal can observe the agent's e¤ort choice. Then, the principal can demand or assign an e¤ort level for the agent by designing a forcing contract. We consider the following set of admissible contracts:
The principal's optimization problem is:
Thus, the principal's problem (2.1) becomes
where R(a; e)´R xf[xjC(a; e)]dx:
Assumptions 2, 4, and 5 imply that R(a; e) is increasing and concave in a and in e: Thus, Assumptions 1 and 3 and the concavity of R(a; e) in a and in e guarantee the existence and uniqueness of a socially e¢cient e¤ort combination (a
The Second-Best
Now, assume that the principal cannot observe the agent's e¤ort choice, and, in addition, monitoring is prohibitively costly. A forcing contract is not feasible and the principal must o¤er an incentive contract to motivate the agent to work hard. In a single moral-hazard situation in which the agent is the only person who inputs e¤ort, it is well known that a …xed rent contract implements the …rst-best outcome when the agent is risk-neutral. 5 However, when both the principal and the agent provide their respective productive e¤ort, such a contract cannot generate the …rst-best outcome. In a double moral-hazard situation, the principal should design the agent's compensation contract to provide an appropriate incentive for the agent as well as her own incentive 4 In this optimization problem, the principal maximizes joint bene…ts. Thus, it is di¤erent from the standard one in which the principal maximizes her bene…ts given the agent's bene…ts are …xed. However, it is easy to see that (2.1) provides the same characterization for the optimal contract as the standard one. Note that in (2.1), the relative weight placed on the agent's bene…ts is given by 1 to rule out a corner solution.
for herself. Consequently, the principal's design of the incentive scheme has to address two incentive problems: one is the agent's incentive provision and the other is her own incentive provision, i.e., a solves
and e solves
Therefore, the principal's optimization problem is:
It is well known that there is no wage contract that implements the …rst-best outcome in double moral-hazard, even when the agent is risk-neutral. Holmstrom [9] shows that any sharing rule that satis…es the budget balancing constraint cannot achieve the …rst-best outcome in team production. 6 Proposition 0. With Assumptions 1 » 5 , there always exists a linear contract s ? (x) = m ? x+n ? ; 0 < m ? < 1; which implements a second-best outcome (a ? ; e ? ) À 0 . In fact,
where U can be any constant.
Proof. See Romano [25] , and Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine [2] . For a more rigorous proof, also see Kim and Wang [14] .
Proposition 0 seems to suggest that the double moral-hazard framework o¤ers an explanation for the prevalence of linear contracts in the real world. 7 For example, 6 Note that both the separability between C(a; e) and µ in generating x and the continuity of C(a; e) are su¢cient to rule out a special case which is discussed in Legros and Masushima [17] (see also Radner and Williams [23] , and Matsushima [20] ). They show that if each member's deviation from the …rst-best e¤ort level cannot be mimicked by other members in team production, then there exists a group mechanism with which the socially e¢cient outcome can be obtained. Such a special case may arise if the separability assumption between C(a; e) and µ in x is relaxed. 7 Holmstrom and Milgrom [10] show that the linear contract is optimal under a speci…c single moral-hazard framework in which the agent with a constant absolute risk aversion obtains private information during the production procedure.
Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine apply their results to explain the franchise contracts in the real world. However, there are still many other contracts di¤erent than s ? (x) in (2.7) that also achieve the same result when the agent is risk-neutral. Thus, it is inadequate as a full explanation, and to make it an appropriate explanation we need to show that the linear contract is robust in terms of some meaningful perturbations.
Here, we want to examine the robustness of the linear contracts with respect to the agent's risk aversion, that is, whether the linear contract is a limiting contract when the agent's risk aversion approaches zero. Thus, in the next section, we …rst derive an optimal contract under the double moral-hazard when the agent is risk-averse, and in Section 4, we test the robustness of the linear contract by making the agent's risk aversion close to zero.
Risk-Averse Agent
Consider the case that the agent is risk-averse. The agent has an increasing and concave utility function on income, u : R ! R .
The incentive compatibility conditions of the both parties are as follows: a solves
By assuming the …rst-order approach is valid in both (3.1) and (3.2), the principal's problem is:
where¸> 0 represents a relative weight placed on the agent's utility in joint bene…ts. The second constraint implies that the agent's wage contract must exist in a given interval, [0; l]: This constraint is needed to guarantee the existence of an optimal wage contract when the agent is risk-averse.
It is already well known that, in a single moral-hazard setting, a lower bound of the wage contract is needed to guarantee the existence of an optimal contract. Otherwise, the principal can attain the result which is arbitrarily close to the full information outcome by severely penalizing the agent with a very small probability. 9 Thus, the principal ends up with no solution.
On the other hand, in a double moral-hazard setting, such an existence issue arrises not only from the agent's side but also from the principal's side (e.g., penalizing the principal in…nitely). Kim and Wang [15] show that, if there is no upper-bound for the wage contract in the double moral-hazard setting, then the double moral-hazard situation arbitrarily closely approaches the single moral-hazard situation. Actually, the principal, by designing a wage contract which is penalizing himself very severely when the outcome is very low, and otherwise is the same as the wage contract which would be optimally designed in the single moral-hazard situation, can e¤ectively provide her own incentive. Since the principal can arbitrarily reduce the outcome range in which she should take the penalty by increasing the penalty amount, she can obtain the result which is arbitrarily close to that in the single moral-hazard situation. Again, 8 Most literature on the validity of the …rst-order approach is associated only with (3.1). Grossman and Hart [5] , and Rogerson [24] show that MLRP and CDFC are su¢cient for the validity of the …rst-order approach when the signal space is of one dimension. Jewitt [11] …nds less restrictive conditions for the validity of the …rst-order approach, which are based on the agent's risk preferences and the distribution function of the signal. Recently, Sinclair-Desgagne [29] shows that more generalized versions of MLRP and CDFC in a multi-dimensional space are su¢cient for the validity of the …rst-order approach when the space of signals is multi-dimensional. However, little is known about the conditions for the validity of the …rst-order approach for both (3.1) and (3.2). the principal thus ends up with no solution in this case. Therefore, for the existence of an optimal contract we need to impose not only the lower bound but also the upper bound on the wage contract.
Economically, placing a lower bound can easily be justi…ed by the existence of a limited liability constraint on the agent's side. Thus, to be symmetric (to impose the limited liability constraint on the principal's side), a suitable way to place an upper bound is to set
However, as will be clear later, this constraint will make our analysis very complicated by making us unable to rule out some unusual characteristics of the optimal contract, but will not change our main results (non-linearity and non-monotonicity of the optimal contract) qualitatively. Thus, we set the boundary constraint as (ii) in (3.3) for analytical simplicity.
Furthermore, we do not need such boundedness of a wage contract when the agent is risk-neutral. In the next section, we will check the robustness of the linear contract by making the agent almost risk-neutral. Thus, to be consistent with this purpose, we will assume that l becomes larger (close to a positive in…nity) when the agent gets more risk-neutral (how exactly large l is will be discussed later).
We now make the following assumption
This assumption is neither strict nor unnatural. In the next section, we will consider the robustness of the linear contract by making u(s) arbitrarily close to 1 s: Since u(s) is concave around 1 s; u 0 (0) must be greater than 1=¸:
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Let L be the Lagrange function of (3.3) without the second constraint. Then,
where¸; ¹ 1 and ¹ 2 are some constants, independent of x; s; a and e: We thus have the Hamilton function:
Given the weight,¸; placed on the agent's utility, the agent's utility function u(s) must be 1 s: Otherwise, we will have a corner solution which is very trivial.
Here, x is treated as a time index in dynamic programming. Thus, we have
The Euler equation,
Let (a ¤ ; e ¤ ) À 0 be the optimal e¤ort choices for (3.3).
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Eq. (3.6) gives the following solution as a candidate for the optimal wage contract s ¤ (x) of (3.3):
where 
(ii) ¹ 2¸0 :
Note that ¹ 1 and ¹ 2 are the Lagrangian multipliers of the agent's and of the principal's incentive constraints, respectively. Thus, ¹ 1 represents the degree of moralhazard problem on the agent's side, whereas ¹ 2 represents that on the principal's side.
The fact that ¹ 1 > 0 implies that the moral-hazard problem on the agent's side is 11 The second-best (a ¤ ; e ¤ ) with the risk-averse agent will generally be di¤erent from the second-best (a ? ; e ? ) with the risk-neutral agent.
always positive. However, the fact that ¹ 2¸0 implies that the moral-hazard problem on the principal's side may be active (
Let s ¤ (xje ¤ ) be the optimal incentive scheme that would be designed to motivate the agent to take a ¤ ; given e ¤ is already taken. Then, it is a single moral-hazard problem, and, from Holmstrom [8] , it is straightforward that
for every x for which the above equation has a solution 0 · s ¤ (xje ¤ ) · l; and otherwise
The fact that ¹ 2 can be zero indicates that when s ¤ (xje ¤ ) is designed for the agent, the residuals for the principal, x ¡ s ¤ (xje ¤ ); may accidentally induce the principal to take e ¤ : In this case, the optimal contract s ¤ (x) in (3.7) will reduce to s ¤ (xje ¤ ): Such asymmetry between ¹ 1 and ¹ 2 arises from the fact that the agent is risk-averse, and the principal is risk-neutral. The incentive provision for a risk-averse party requires that the incentive scheme be a …ne tuning on every x , while that for a risk-neutral party does not require that.
Now, we draw Figure 1 to explain the third result in Proposition 1. 
in two di¤erent cases. In there, x c ; x 1 ; and x 2 denote the output levels satisfying
(x 2 jC ¤ ) = 0; respectively. As drawn in Figure 1 ,¸+
is increasing in x almost everywhere
is increasing in x almost everywhere as well.
The proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix shows that we heavily rely on our boundary condition assumption such as 0 · s(x) · l to prove
If we use 0 · s(x) · x + l as a boundary condition, then we cannot rule out the case in
is decreasing in x almost everywhere, and one can easily see that the optimal contract s ¤ (x) will have a rather unusual form which is also non-linear and non-monotonic. Our main purpose here is to show that the optimal contract s ¤ (x) is generally non-linear and not always monotonic. Therefore, we focus on the …rst case in Figure 1 by assuming the boundary condition as 0 · s(x) · l .
By using the results in Proposition 1, we now characterize the optimal contract s ¤ (x) more precisely as is described in the following propositions. Since the characteristics of an optimal contract when ¹ 2 = 0 is obvious from the standard single moral-hazard literature, we hereafter exclusively focus on the case in which ¹ 2 > 0:
Assuming the …rst-order approach is valid, if l 0 · l · l 1 ; where l 0 is de…ned in Proposition 1 (iii), and l 1 satis…es
; then there is a unique optimal contract s ¤ (x) which is monotonically increasing, such that
where x 0 satis…es
Note that when l changes, the combination of the optimal e¤ort choices (a ¤ ; e ¤ ) also change. Thus,
changes, so does l 1 : Therefore, one may reasonably suspect that l satisfying l 0 · l · l 1 may not exist because l > l 1 ; 8l¸l 0 . However, the following lemma shows that it is incorrect.
Lemma 2. The set of upper bounds fljl 0 · l · l 1 g where l 1 satis…es
is not an empty set. (xjC ¤ ) is unbounded below, there is a unique optimal contract s ¤ (x); which is NOT monotonically increasing, such that
where x 0 is de…ned in Proposition 2 and x 3 satis…es By the same reason as discussed above, we now need to show that there exists l which is larger than l 1 : The following lemma shows that the set fljl > l 1 g is not an empty set as well.
Lemma 3. There exists l such that l > l 1 where l 1 is de…ned in Proposition 2.
The proof of Lemma 3 especially shows that l is usually greater than l 1 when l is very large. Thus, as mentioned earlier, we will focus on the case in Proposition 3 rather than the one in Proposition 2 to be consistent with our discussion in the next section.
Before we go on to the next section, we provide intuitive explanations for Propositions 2 and 3. The range of x can be decomposed by three intervals such as X 3 = (¡1; x 2 ); X 2 = [x 2 ; x 1 ); X 1 = [x 1 ; 1); where x 1 and x 2 satisfy
is not a maximizing solution but a minimizing solution for x 2 X 3 . Therefore, from Lemma 1, it follows immediately that s
For x 2 X 1 ; Eq. (3.7) characterizes s ¤ (x) since H ss < 0: Since
in (3.7) is increasing in x , ranging from 0 to
f it is less than l or to l if it is greater than l:
Thus, it is shown that the optimal wage contract derived under the double moralhazard is non-linear when the agent is risk-averse. This is because risk sharing between both parties must be taken into account in addition to their incentive provision in designing a contract. However, the fact that ¹ 1 > 0 and ¹ 2¸0 in (3.7) illustrates that the optimal wage contract in (3.7) is less sensitive to the output than that under the single moral-hazard. 13 As a matter of fact, the key factor that makes the optimal wage contract under the double moral-hazard di¤er from that under the single moral- (3.7) . Intuitively, in a single moral-hazard setting, if there were changes in output x; such information would be fully re ‡ected in the agent's rewards, because the agent is the only party who is in charge of production. However, in a double moral-hazard setting, such information will be re ‡ected in the agent's rewards with a discount since the principal is also responsible for production. In fact, the term
in (3.7) represents such a discount factor in the double moral-hazard, and its presence reduces the sensitivity of the agent's rewards to the output. 13 Too much sensitivity of the optimal contract to the outcomes in the single moral-hazard model has been a major criticism to the standard agency theory. For this issue, see Hart and Holmstrom [7] and Holmstrom and Milgrom [10] .
Propositions 2 and 3 also show that, unlike the single moral-hazard situation, the double moral-hazard situation requires not only MLRP and CDFC but also that the possible maximum reward for the agent (i.e., the possible maximum penalty against the principal) lie in a certain range to guarantee the monotonicity of the agent's wage contract, that is, l < l 1 : This di¤erence mainly comes from the fact that balancing both parties' incentives must be taken into account in designing the agent's wage contract in the double moral-hazard situation. If the maximum penalty against the principal can be very high (i.e., l > l 1 ), then penalizing the principal with maximum (i.e., s ¤ (x) = l ) and rewarding the agent with maximum when the outcome is very low (i.e., x < x 3 )
can be e¢cient. Penalizing the principal and rewarding the agent when the outcome is very low will strengthen the principal's incentive, but at the same time will weaken the agent's incentive. However, the principal's increased incentive can dominate the agent's decreased incentive if the maximum penalty against the principal is very high, since the principal is risk-neutral and the agent is risk-averse (the agent has a concave utility function, while the principal has a linear utility function). But, this kind of incentive scheme will not work when the maximum penalty is not su¢ciently large (i.e., l < l 1 ).
Another point of interest is that, as can be shown from Figures 2 and 3 especially when l is su¢ciently large such that
This tells that the agent's reward is internally bounded above, even if the exogenous boundary condition for s ¤ (x) is not binding.
If there is an increment in output, 4x; when the output is already high, it will be e¢cient to allocate most of 4x to the principal. Again, this is because the agent is risk-averse (having a concave utility function) and the principal is risk-neutral (having a linear utility function). Given the situation that the output is high with both parties already receiving big rewards, if there is an increment in output, then giving more to the agent will have less impact on his incentive than giving the same amount to the principal would have on the principal's incentive.
Robustness of the Linear Sharing Rule
It is well known that the linear contract is one of the many optimal contracts when the agent is risk-neutral. And, in Section 3, we show that the unique optimal contract is generally non-linear when the agent is risk-averse. In this section, we investigate whether or not the linear contract survives as a limiting contract as the agent's risk aversion reduces to zero.
To consider this problem explicitly, we assume that the agent's utility function has a HARA form. De…ning the HARA utility
where (®;¯;°) 2 R and A¸0;°= 1 if¯= 0:
we have
From the third expression, we see:
u is risk neutral: u(s) = As;
if ® = 0;
u is exponential with risk aversion ® :
u is homothetic with risk aversion ® :
For the HARA utility, (3.7) becomes
Thus, the optimal contract is
The second case in (4.2) includes the log utility function when ® = 1: The third case includes risk neutrality when ® = 0: Notice that, for simplicity, we have chosen ; for s > ¡ ®°; where¯> 0;°= 1 if ® = +1: When ® ! 0; it converges to risk neutrality; and when ® ! +1; it converges to the exponential utility function. The advantage of our HARA utility is that the convergencies to the three important cases are done by the convergencies of three separate parameters to zero, as shown in (4.2). This point is critical to us, since we will consider ® ! 0: For Merton's HARA utility, however, when ® ! 0; it moves away from the exponential utility. This does not happen to our HARA utility. for x¸x 0 :
De…ne the distance of two contracts s 1 and s 2 in S as
where m(¢) is the Lebesgue measure. When a sequence of contracts fs n g converges to a contract s 0 based on the above notion of distance between any two contracts, we say that fs n g converges to s 0 almost surely.
Proposition 4.
When the HARA utility converges to risk neutrality by any path, i.e.,
for any sequence f® n g of ®; the optimal contract s ¤ n (x) corresponding to risk aversion ® n never converges almost surely to any unbounded contract, including a linear contract, on x 2 (¹ x; +1); where ¹ x satis…es f c [¹ xjC(¹ a; ¹ e)] = 0 and (¹ a; ¹ e) is the solution of (2.4) and (2.5).
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In Section 3, we imposed upper-bound l on the wage contract to guarantee the existence of the optimal contract when the agent was risk-averse. However, we did not impose such an upper-bound in Section 2, since the existence of the optimal contract could easily be guaranteed without the upper-bound when the agent was risk-neutral. Therefore, to be consistent with the previous sections, we consider the case in which l is a su¢ciently big number such that l > l 1 for any risk aversion of the agent, i.e., for any ®: Therefore, to show the non-convergence result, we focus on the contract in Proposition 3 and consider whether or not the right-hand side of the contract, i.e., the part of the contract de…ned on [x 0 ; 1); converges to a linear contract. 16 Since Proposition 3 shows that the optimal contract on [x 0 ; 1) can solely be characterized by (4.4), we see whether s ¤ (x) in (4.4) converges to a linear contract. Furthermore, the proof of Proposition 4 shows that l 1 is bounded as ® goes to zero. Thus, from Lemma 3, we can easily see that such l always exists for any ®:
As we show in the proof,
is bounded as ® ! 0: Because, as shown in Proposition 3, the right-hand side of the optimal contract is bounded by
we can easily see that the optimal contract does not converge to a linear contract as ® ! 0: Therefore, Proposition 4 indicates that the linear contract s ?
given by (2.7)
is not robust in the sense that a tiny change in the agent's attitude towards risk will 15 We can actually show (¹ a; ¹ e) = (a ? ; e ? ):
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For the non-convergence result, considering the left-hand side of the contract is meaningless because the left-hand side of the contract is characterized by the boundary condition. result in a dramatic contractual deviation from s ?
. More strongly, it shows that any utility function in the HARA family does not generate the linear contract as a limiting contract as the agent's risk aversion approaches zero. Thus, the linear sharing rule s ? is not a good approximation of the optimal contract when the agent's risk aversion is very small.
Although we do not explicitly derive the exact form of a limiting contract, the proof in the Appendix in fact shows that the limiting contract varies with the agent's utility function and the stochastic production function f (xjC): Therefore, it is not surprising that there are many optimal contracts, and the linear contract is only one of them when the agent is risk-neutral.
Numerical Examples
In this section, we provide some numerical examples of the contracts in Propositions 2 and 3, using exponential utility and distribution functions. We use Mathcad 7 (copyright of Mathsoft) to solve the model, and use Powerpoint 97 (copyright of Microsoft) to draw the contract curve using the data produced by Mathcad 7.
We choose
c(a; e) = a + e; = 1:
Note that ® denotes the agent's absolute risk aversion.
Using the Lagrange function in (3.4), the …rst-order conditions for (a ¤ ; e ¤ ) generate
We use the above two equations plus the two incentive conditions in and the contract in the following …gure. 17 In actual numerical calculations, to reduce the computing time from several hours to about one minute, we need to simplify the four equations using given functions. The derivation of the simpli…ed formulas and the actual MathCAD …les of the numerical calculations are available upon request. Note that the contract with ® = 0:1 exhibits the same pattern as the one in Figure  4a , except that the contract is taller. In fact, we can see that the contract in Figure  4b is ‡atter than the one in Figure 4a when x is large. This shows that the contract does not converge to the linear contract in any right-half line of x when the agent's risk aversion approaches zero.
The Contract in Proposition 3
For the contract in Proposition 3, we choose the upper bound l = 12 which is su¢ciently big, keeping ® = 1: We then …nd As calculated above, if l is su¢ciently big, we have l > l 1 : This numerically con…rms Lemma 3. As drawn in Figure 5a , the numerical contract shows a pattern which is consistent with the one in Figure 3 . 
Thus, this show that our non-convergence result does not hinge upon the upper bound, l:
Conclusion
The main focus of this paper is on the double moral-hazard situation in which the principal also participates in the production process. A simple linear contract is one of the optimal contracts when the agent is risk-neutral. When the agent is risk-averse, however, there is a unique optimal contract, which is typically non-linear. We show that the agent's rewards in this case are less sensitive to output than that would be designed under single moral-hazard. When the principal also participates in the production process, the changes in output convey only partial information about the agent's hidden action choice, because not only the agent but also the principal is responsible for production.
We also examine the robustness of the linear contract by studying the feature of contract when the agent's risk aversion goes to zero. We …nd that the limiting contract is not a linear contract. Thus, the linear contract is not a good approximation of the optimal contract under double moral-hazard when the agent is almost risk-neutral.
However, we conjecture that, if the agent obtains private information after the contract but before taking action, only the linear contract would achieve the e¢cient outcome since only the linear contract would make the agent's action choice independent of his private information. However, further research is needed to verify this conjecture.
Appendices Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 1
If s ¤ is optimal, it must be the solution of
Let h(x) be any Lebesgue measurable function, satisfying h(1) = h(¡1) = 0: For any constant t 2 R; function s t (x)´s ¤ (x) + th(x) will also be admissible and satisfy the initial and terminal conditions s t (1) = s ¤ (1) and s t (¡1) = s ¤ (¡1): De…ne
V reaches the maximum when t = 0: The …rst-order condition is
Since h is an arbitrary measurable function taking zero at the two ends, the above implies
The second-order condition is
for any measurable function h satisfying h(1) = h(¡1) = 0: By a lemma in Kamien and Schwartz [12, pp.39], we then have (3.8).
The su¢ciency of (3.8) is proven in Kamien and Schwartz [12, pp.38 ].
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 1
To prove Proposition 1, we need the following lemma as an intermediate step.
Let ± e(a) be the principal's full incentive e¤ort given the agent's e¤ort a; i.e., Also, let s ¤ (xje) be an optimal incentive scheme that would be designed to motivate the agent to take a ¤ ; given e is already taken. Then, from Holmstrom [8] , it is straightforward that
for every x for which Eq. (B.2) has a solution 0 · s ¤ (xje) · l; and otherwise
and
Thus, SW (s ¤ ) denotes the joint bene…ts resulting from s ¤ (x) when the principal's e¤ort is not contractible. In fact, (a ¤ ; e ¤ ) will be chosen when s ¤ (x) is designed. On the other hand, SW c [s ¤ (¢je)] denotes the joint bene…ts resulted from s ¤ (xje) when e is committed (the superscript ' c ' indicates that the principal's e¤ort level is contractible).
It is straightforward that
since the right-hand side is the joint bene…ts that are obtainable without the principal's incentive constraint, while the left-hand side is the one obtainable with the constraint.
is strictly increasing in e; for e · ± e(a ¤ ): Lemma B1 says that when the principal can commit to her own e¤ort level, it is more desirable for her to commit to a higher e · ± e(a ¤ ) when she wishes to motivate the agent to take a ¤ : First, higher e · ± e(a ¤ ) derives higher bene…t directly from R(a ¤ ; e)¡V (e): Second, higher e generates more precise information about the agent's hidden e¤ort choice. This is because, as e increases, the variability of the likelihood ratio associated with a increases, i.e., var( Now, by using Lemma B1, we can …nally prove Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 1
(i) ¹ 1 > 0 and ¹ 2¸0 :
We will ignore the boundary conditions and show the equivalence of
We will have ¹ 1¸0 and ¹ 2¸0 if (A) and (B) are equivalent. For that, we need to
show that the two IC conditions in (A) must be binding for any solution of (A).
We …rst show that IC 1 must be binding. Let (ŝ;â;ê) be a solution of (A), with Lagrange multipliers1 1 and1 2 : We know1 1¸0 and1 2¸0 : By Kuhn-Tucker Theorem, if IC 1 is not binding, then we must have1 1 = 0: De…ne x 2 such that
18 whereĈ´C(â;ê) , andĈ e´Ce (â;ê) . Since1 2¸0 ; we have 1 +1 2Ĉe fc f (xjĈ) < 0 for x 2 (¡1; x 2 ); by Assumption 4. Thus, from (3.5), we have
for x 2 (¡1; x 2 ): Therefore, the optimal contractŝ(x) for x 2 (¡1; x 2 ) isŝ(x) = l:
in which case (3.7) plus the boundary condition 0 ·ŝ(x) · l characterize the optimal contractŝ(x): Since1 2¸0 and ¹ 1 = 0; the solution in (3.7) must be decreasing.
Consequently, the optimal contractŝ(x) is decreasing in x 2 (¡1; 1): This is a contradiction with the fact thatâ > 0: 19 Thus, IC 1 must be binding.
We thus consider the problem 19 One can easily show thatâ 6 = 0 from the fact that a ¤ 6 = 0 .
We now show that IC 2 must also be binding. Let (ŝ;â;ê) be a solution of (C), with Lagrange multipliers1 1 and1 2 : By the above proof, we have1 1 > 0 (it is easy to see that ¹ 1 6 = 0 from the above proof). If IC 2 is not binding, then1 2 = 0 by the Kuhn-Tucker condition. Then, we haveŝ(x) =ŝ(¢jê) satisfying
However, by Lemma B1, we can then increase SW (ŝ) = SW [ŝ(¢jê)] by increasingê slight. That is, by continuity ofŝ(xje) and f c [xjC(a; e)] in e and by Fatou's Lemma, we can …nd " > 0 such that IC 2 still holds strictly:
while by de…nition ofŝ(xje); IC Thus, we have proven that ¹ 1 > 0 and ¹ 2¸0 :
If ¹ 2 = 0; by the fact that ¹ 1 > 0; it is already true that ¹ 1 C ¤ a >¸¹ 2 C ¤ e : Thus, it su¢ces to prove under ¹ 2 > 0: 20 When applying Lemma B1 in the above, we needê+" · ± e(â): That is, we need to showê < ± e(â):
Since Z s(x; 0)f c (xjc)dx = 0 and1 1¸0 ; we then have
± e(â)]¡V 0 [ ± e(â)] = 0 and the concavity of R(a; e)¡V 0 (e) in e; we must haveê < ± e(â):
Then, the optimal contract s ¤ is a …xed wage contract. This is a contradiction since a …xed wage contract gives zero incentive to the agent.
For x > x 2 ; by Assumption 4,
and since
; we havȩ
Thus, H ss < 0 for x > x 2 ; and Eq. (3.7) plus the boundary condition 0 · s ¤ (x) · l determine an optimal solution for s ¤ (x) when
is decreasing in x 2 (x 2 ; +1) , ranging from +1 to
Therefore, the optimal contract s ¤ (x) for x¸x 2 is decreasing,
Since
Therefore, s ¤ (x) = l; for x 1 · x < x 2 :
21 Such x 2 may not exist; in that case, we take x 2 = +1:
22
Note that, since l > l 0 ; and
23 Such x 1 may not exist. In that case, we take x 1 = ¡1:
(xjC ¤ ) < 0; implying H ss > 0; i.e., H is strictly convex in s: This means that the optimal contract s ¤ (x) for x < x 1 will take either 0 or l: We have
where G is a residual term that does not contain s: Thus, s ¤ (x) takes l if
is decreasing for x < x 1 ; ranging from
; for x < x 1 :
Therefore, Eq. (B.10) is satis…ed and s ¤ (x) = l for x < x 1 :
Consequently, we have shown that for a su¢ciently large l that is greater than l 0 ;
However, this cannot be the case because it gives the agent negative incentive.
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 2
De…ne x 1 such that
For
(xjC ¤ ) > 0 . Thus, the second order condition H ss · 0 con…rms that s(x) in (3.7) is the optimal contract in [x 1 ; +1);
before the boundary condition s(x) 2 [0; l] is imposed. Thus, for x¸x 1 , we have
If this x 1 does not exist, take x 1 = ¡1:
Note that¸+
is increasing in x¸x 1 ; ranging from 0 to
And by Assumption 6, there always exists x 0 2 [x 1 ; +1) such that
Also, note that l can be greater or less than (u 0 ) ¡1 (
) . Therefore, we …nally have for the optimal contract on [x 1 ; +1)
De…ne x 2 such that
Then, we have
(xjC ¤ )¸0; for x 2 · x < x 1 , we have
Therefore, s ¤ (x) = 0; for x 2 · x < x 1 :
(xjC ¤ ) < 0; we have H ss > 0 for any s: This implies that s ¤ (x) will take either 0 or l: Denote
where G is the residual term that does not contain s: Thus, s ¤ (x) will take 0 if Hj s=l · Hj s=0 ; i.e.,
However, (C.2) is guaranteed by the fact that¸+
is increasing for x < x 2 ;
ranging from
Appendix D: Proof of Lemma 2
Assume that l = l 0 : Then, by Proposition 1 (iii), we have
:
is increasing in z; we must have l 0 = l < l 1 :
Appendix E: Proof of Proposition 3
This proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 2. We only need to prove the existence of a …nite x 3 : Since
is strictly increasing in l; we have
increases from
where x 2 < x 1 is de…ned in the proof of Proposition 2, by the unboundedness of
Appendix F: Proof of Lemma 3
Assume contrarily that l · l 1 for any l: This implies that
We only need to consider a sequence of l that goes to +1 for which ¹ 1 C The First Case: Consider the …rst case …rst. Since l · l 1 ; the optimal contract s ¤ (x) must be the one in Proposition 2. Consider
Given an arbitrary small positive number "; let x l satisfy fc f
is strictly increasing by Assumption 4, such " must exist. Again, since
is increasing, we have
for x¸x l ; and
Since the second-best e¤orts (a ¤ ; e ¤ ) are always bounded by the …rst-best e¤orts, we have
The Second Case: Thus, the only possible way is that ¹ 2 C ¤ e goes to zero, while ¹ 1 C ¤ a goes to a …nite non-negative constant. Kim and Wang [15] We …rst show that x 0 is bounded above by ¹ x + " for any " > 0 when ® is su¢ciently small, where f c (¹ xj ¹ C) = 0: From (4.3), we have u 0 (0) = A°¡ where the subscript n indicates the corresponding variables under risk aversion ® n ;
i.e., for example, C for almost all x 2 (¹ x; 1): 25 We can actually show (¹ a; ¹ e) = (a ? ; e ? ):
26
From the objective function in (3.3), it is easy to see that if A 6 = 1=¸; then risk neutrality ® = 0 leads to a corner solution, rather than s ? : Therefore, for a meaningful discussion of convergence, we must choose A = 1=¸: 27 (G.3) may fail if s ¤ n (x) ! ¡°as n ! 1 for some x: Since s ¤ is always increasing on (¹ x; 1) for any l; ¹ s must be increasing on (¹ x; 1): Since ¹ s is unbounded, there must be an M; M > ¹ x; such that ¹ s(x) > ¡°for x > M: We can then replace ¹ x by M in the rest of the proof, and the proof will still go through.
Let G n´¹2n C ¤ en : Consider any convergent subsequence fG n k g of fG n g: Note that G n¸0 since ¹ 2n k¸0 and C ¤ en k > 0: Let the limit of this subsequence be G; which may be in…nity.
If G = 0; ¹ 2n k converges to zero since C e (¹ a; ¹ e) > 0 by assumption. Thus, by (G.4), ¹ 1n k also converges to zero. From (3.4), when ¹ 1n k ! 0 and ¹ 2n k ! 0; the …rst-order conditions at the limits of a n k and e n k ; i.e., ¹ a and ¹ e; become: ¡1 ¡ 1 ¢ : Therefore, the limiting cannot be a linear contract, which is unbounded.
